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ABSTRACT
This research report defends Seymour ]?apert' s assertion
tha:1; LOGO researchers 'have "missed the point" of the
philosophy which underpins the, LOoGO learning environment.
It> establishes continuities between Papert's "exercise in
an applied genetic epistemology" and Jea:rl' Piagetl"s
genetic epistemology. G\iven"this relationship the report
argues that Papert's theory and rese#rch should be. :-'
located within the p,~agetian research prograllune. From
this perspective Papert IS assertiol1 is justified to the
extent that LOGO researchers have "missed the point" of
his epistemolo~ical concerns and misconstrued the
constructivist nature of the LOGO learning environment.
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I <:ieclare that this research {i-eport is my own, unaided
""ork'. It is being submitted in partial ftilf;i.lment ofuhe
~}
requirements for ~he degree of Master 91: Educa.tion l:>Y ()
Coursework. in the universi.ty of the.) Witwat,ersrand, = ;"
Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any
o
degree or examination in any other ,university.;:;) ,- " ,
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The \social mediati'on provided .by familY,:.:. b'~~ehers I'
colle~gues I' a,nd friends have. played f), si£tnifioant' !~i)le in
my ift~ellectr~lal develppment;~ My.,'.parents I' c,M0(')!!.l.i'l and
Jasmin~~Bagus" 'always . .believ~d that intellectuaJi', labour
was the \only ft)p'n of 1)abour I, i.oughf.c.to engage in. and have
supporte~ me in. making their wish a reality. Mohammedand
Aln~naAb~~msI .my pa.rents.7in-law, j! have "s;imilarly. provided
tlnstinting\ . support •••.•and .encou1:agtament. Anver Cass'im
introduced '\me to ..compUt;ers., tawaht m,ewhat I know. about.
cqm~ll:tirtY',t~p.tl' helpe? me in UrllCo1Ant.ab1.eways dve~ man¥
ye\~r's. She~~tfn CassJ.m de~onst]cat.:,ed .that. thrQ,ugh $heer _;"
forpe.\ Qf will~ .one can accQ~pl~<sh many things, while 7.Cty
gQg;;'\p~,ild, 'Rai\~a, confirmed),}"t,pat ,piaget is i ~~ssentia];ly
corr~c"~. Ian Mq,ll, :my teacijert supervisor and colleague",
,~ntroliu9~ddJit6 .. t~ the 'real '.'-pf~a,get and has been "i,,)hlSm9s!!tjEormativ~~inf;tu,~~,ce,.~Ln ll!Y i~lteillectual. develoPi~ent .. l-1;y
'teacher's\ and, col.l~eagl~es an the Department of Eci\;tcatJ.oI1,;·
Wits, hav!a a:tways \~nct.;1uragedThe. and I want .to than~ Lynne
Slonimsky'\ and Marion i Drew /1 ~n l'a;cticqlar for \ their
support. Qliyer 'ru:fnbu~l., Mark So+ms and Karen K,~plan-
Solms were". and cdntirme to be, the exemplars o+,. ·.the
scholarship, I will:, always aspire to attain. Mus\tapha
Zardad ..intr(i)duc,1ed.m~}to '.th\~ English "J.an,~age and, thtough
.the years i'iichael Whites.1de has grea.tlY improV'e~ my Q
\ldiosyncrat,tq use of, ..this difficult 'langu.age. Fina~lYI
and very' importantly,. I must ac~nowled9~ the
conlpanionShip .and . support:' of myI;, "fr~ends;j" the "Senate~
House Coromitte,~. for I-lig'her Learning" I steven. de Kiewit ....(a '\\""
fountainhead of wisdom and. a pillar of strength)., 5;!?~ev~~n\,
Panoyan, Glorh, cast':r il:t.ion , Dimitri. vratsanos/( 'clopal '"
Rams~~~y-Cook, Char~le:s'Ci?Oper, Johnathan Stadler I~ Kerry·..
Jane. $lsdon, Charmlail:'leViljoen, steven. Lawrence;\ Paula
Mend!e~{kJody La~,idos, Monique Verq:uyn and Andrea: l)'iuxham.
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In the late 1970 I S and early 1980 I s the field of comp\lter~
in" educ~f,!ionexpe:r:ienceda veritable revol,"\tiqn. 'I'he growin,~~\
\\
availability" of relati'itely inexpensive thc'ugll inqreasingly,\!
mor{~powerf~J.microcomputers and the concomitant development\
'I
of efficient oper#ting systems and user-friendly, comput.er, \i,""
~ \',
I'\\ .,,",
\\, .
te.lchnical \
~\
\"
\'
\\i
\
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I:NTRODt1C'l' I ON
languages 'unlocked' the true, general-purpO'se, cap~\city of
the computer. Following these signi.ficant
innc)V~tion91a growing numbe:r:of researchers and soft\vare
developurf:ibegan to extend ~he,previously r.estric'ted use of"
the computer and to challenge the historically entrenched
conceptions of the computer~ Although these
cirial.lenges affected all domaLns" "!'of computer-use, it was
.1,~.., .,',
;'.>\~••j
especially in the field of education that the 40gmatic
.(~
thir!king about tbe uses 'of computers attracted the most
severe criticism.
One of the most articulate and influential critics of the
prevailing dogmatism in ~he thinkil~~ and uses of computers
in education was ,··the and Artificial
Intelligence
i'!
(AI)
\\
researcher seYJl1~\urPapertl of. \:the
<' \\
t\\\
\'\\
1 Fpr biogr~phical details see Goldberg (1991).
\Massacpusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In his survey
t~f the extant' uses of computers in education, Papert (1979)
\
identif ied thre~ modes of computer-use which, he p.rffil,ed.
elsewhere, that. t.e'Chnologicalclearly showed most
Lnnevabf.ons in education were tantaml.:mntto "inventing new
gadgets to teach the same oJ.,dstuf.f in a thinly disguiseq
v~;rsion of th(-f sa~;~ old W'ay"(P.apert, ~970/1980, p. 161),.
This criticism formed the basis of papert's intervention in
·the field of computers in education, and to provide a.
c;::ontextfor undertstanding his work, the controversies that ="
it has generq.:ted, and tl1e issues that will be addressed in
this research report, it is necessary to review some of his
criticisms of the !tradi t ional • uses of q~mputers in
)
\,./;;/1
';!
(/
(1979), the first and most pervasive
education.
According to Papert
applica"t7ion of computers in education was "the cOlr;puteras
il
I' \automat:~d teacher", popularly known as computer Aided
Instruction. (CAl). In this applioCi'cionthe comput'~rwas used
as a 'teacher •" unwaveringly pl..ltting the child through
drill-and"'practice exercises (see for e.g." suppas, 1966),.
The second, "the computer as simulat~Cl world'i, was less
extensivelY used and in this applica.i;.ion the child was
exposed computational simulations
"
to
si tuations. The child was expected to manipulate various
variables tp see their effects Ln the silnulated world and,
by exteh;,;ion, to d.iscover the effects of such manipulated
changes in the real" world. The thir(3. appliC;:::f1tionwas "the
, !,~.I c,
computer as toy". In this apPli~a_t.~b children .were taught
", ,"""", , "";",,,.//~to",Pl'o9.ramtlle computer by USJ.'ii'{g a simple compu.ter language
such., as BASIC2 Whiqh, it was argued, would make them
"computer literate" and provide them with skills deemed to
!~'}
be essential for survival in the "information age". Although
Pap«9l"e~?l9reedthat each: of t:):u~seapplications could serve a
If
val.:U:l (though limited)
(~"
educationa:f; fUnction, he \'-.~was
~particular 1)'
psychological
about the ,ep.:i.;;stE7mological,.
and educational assumptions which the¥,
,)
embodied, and the conceptions of know~(~ageI learning and
teaChing which they promot,~d.
I?,
'First, he argued, "the computer as automated teacher II was
based on the view that knowledge con$isted of a fixed body
of discrete facts. Learning was therefore seen as a process
of responding correq,tly to q.uestions about discrete facts
(/
and the attainm.ent of pre-determined, a.nd s;trictlY
specified, behavioural objectives .. Correspondingly, teaching
was viewed as the systematic presentation Of discrete hits
of information management. ofeffectiveand the
1Icontingenc~es'of reinforcement" to reinforce 'appropriate'
behaviour. Secondly, Papert felt that although Uthe computer
as simulated World" allowed the child some freedom to
2 BASIC (Beginners All=purpose S.::oJ:iolicInstt'uction Code) is
one of the most popular computer progranuu'ing languages.
discover. aspects of ~n9wledge for ,herself,
was consurained by pre-defi-ned boundaries.
therefor'e presentsq as" a fixed and immutabl~ e~tity I whil(a
learnirig entailed the seemYIlglyacti v« .discovery of pre-
determined
;;
application,
bits of information. "Teaching, in this
.r<._(l__--===-------
amounted. to :;~he presentation of pUrportedfy-,.
open-ended information. Thirdly I Papert argued, by using a
Ij
simplistic and: restrictive computer lari'guage, "the computer
i\ as toy" unde\mined the complex nature of knowledg.e and'.
1~.
restricted thet chj>ld's ,\ oreative potentiaI'. That is i the ;'"
child was c;:(ivenso~e freedom to engage actively in the
.' j~
lea.rning process but the nature of this activity was
restricted .because of the limited capacity of BASIC.Thus,
insofar as the teaching of BASIC cona:esfed of the
Jitransmission t of specific prOgramntingcommandsat specified
f) 0 _ .,' \.\
times in the learning process, the notioIt of teao:li'ng as')the
translnission of plre'"'deb~rmined bits of inform,i1tion was
i-
reinf'orced.
From the" for~going analysis :tt was evident, E!,ccordingto
Papert (1970/1980), that all the extant uses ,of the computer
in education were firmly entrench~d within a strict
/-'
behaviourist framework and consistent w'ith skinner's ideas
'OX}progranuned.learning and teaching machines (Skinner, 1966 ;
1968; 198.6)• As Such, Papert argued further, these
I' , ~y"'>
,applications were ~kin to the "QWERTYphenomenonU3 in the
development
(I.
of t~chnology. Furthermore, tQ.1i'J{')tended to
encourage and legitimate what Papert called the "Pop-Ed
1\
CuIturell • This ' commonsense' conception of learning arid
te)ic:hing pr~ot.ed the view th_-at children should nat be
) ~. ;~, 1\ ••. ,/'~' .,
",~,', . // .',L~' ',/',:::J" .!'\.L,:, " (/
;')'3'""t~~9ht:o -think about their thh.king ("the don't think about
your thinking paradox"); 'failed to discoul:age the student
practice of making'your mind,a blank and wait-tang,',for an idea
to come ("blank mind theories"); encouraged \1:P~ir idea that.
(l, 'I':'
understanding colt.es .in a flash (Ug'ettil'lg-i~j;theories'·.); and
//
reinforced Hie "notion that you either "1)p$sess or lack the
ability to llla~ter particular areas of knowlr,edge,("faculty
theoriesli).
To challenge ))
;)
these anachronistic and essentially
~ \\
cons~~Y-~I.J(.fveus s of the computer to bolster the social and
educational status quo, Papert (1970/1980; 1980) proposed Un
t!.'
altern\,ative "grander vision" of computers in education ;"vhich
3 QWERTY'is the ariangement of the alphabetic keys on the
top row of the standard typewriter keyboard;, Originally the
most commonlyused letters in the English language (D.·"H-I-Ac..
T-H-E-N-S-O-R)were. spread out to reduoe typing spell::"\hd
the concomitant jammingof the keys. Despite technologfcal
advances :which'eliminated this problem and. the development
of 1l10;,-e rationally or9'~nised and ergonomically efficient
keyboards (for e.g., the Dvorak Simplified Keyboard) the
QWERTYkeyboard became entrenched" as the universal st~l:ldard.
This phenomenon, accordingi,to GoUld (1991), is akin to the
panda's obsolete thumb and demonstrates an important aspect
of evolutionary history: "what,was once a sensible solution
'becomesan oddity or imperfection in the altered. context Qf
a new future"(p. 66).
'i}
if
II
I.
If
,.~'
Co
was based on the epistemological and psycho:l.ogicCill ideas of
Jean Piag~t and concepts" derived fromAIl:.e:aearch.This
vision. 'included a pract~cal and a theoretical dimension. The
practical .dimension Was the LOG04 programming language which
papert:,:developed with his associates at MIT as a computer-
based learning eJ'lVironment which CQuld facili'l1.ate children's
construction of mathematical knowledge. The theoretical
0:::.::,
dimension was elabo)::'atsd in his seminal book, Mindstorms:
\)
Children. computers and Powerful Ideas (papert, 1980) j.
unpublished lllem'branda (Papert, 1971; 197:3; 1976; papert, et .7'
al. , 1979) ; interviews (Hereford, 1982; White, 1985;
Reinhold, 19815'); journal articles and conference papers
(Papert,
..
1980a; 1980d; 1981; 1982; 1984; 1984ai 1984b;
<:;
1986ai 1986b; 1987; 1988); c6'-authored articles (Franz ~
Papert, 1988; Ttt:rkle &; Papert, 1990); and. qhapters in books
(Papert, 1970/1980; 1972/1980; 197,; 1978/1980; 1979; 1980b;
1980c; 1986; 1987a; 1988a; 1991; 1991a)S.
Following the favourable reception of Mindstorms and the
'endorsement I of LOGOby the influential computer journal
Byte - which devoted an entire edi tion to the language and
4 To distinguish the original program from its more recent
derivatives - i.e., Logowriter (Papert, 1986a); LEGO/t,ogo
{Resnick & Ocko, 1991}; *Logo '('pronounced st:"'t"-logo)
.(Resnick, 1991); and MultiLogo (Resni ..::k, 1S,.;·.~./l).., the name
'''LOGO''will be capitalised throughout this research report.
5 For a :more complete listing of Papert's writings see
Solomon (1987).
its philosophy (Byte, Vol. 7, No. S, August 1982) - LOGO
rapidly gained near-universal acceptance in the field of
computers and education. , Educational administrators,
(]
teachers, research~rs and computer enthusiasts began to
agitate for its incc):t'poration into the school cur:t;"iculuTIland
a host }jf researchers began to investigate the educational
effic,acl( off LOGO. Consequently, during the de~ade 1980 ....c
) 'I~'i
1990, a wealth of'i.i'researchG on LOGOand (ledY.cation w~a.s
fr'"
ie\,
generated (for a revie-Xirof this Ii tera'i::,U:;;:es e sorkin I 19S4 t,
;
Palmgren, 1985; Ab~ls~:m,.
o
et ale I 1986; Forman &: Pufall,
1988;1'Harper 19'89; sq'.,huyten &: Valcke,1/' . ,
;/
pa?iert~ 1991) 7.
This researoh,
"L
like th€.:('more general research on learnfng,
"from media (see for e.g., Clark tit sugrue, 1990), has,
howevel:{/~)en fraught with "controversy and paradox" (Lepper
''\.,/ ......-1"
&: Gurtnert 1989). The qualitative research find:i:ngs on
children '.s constructive acti vi ty in the LOGOenvironment·
6 An indication of the .magnitude of this research, literature
can. be inferred from SummersI (1985) bibl.iometric analysis
o~ the growth of journal literature on computers arid
education and the bibliography on LO(';O compiled by Lough
(1985). "
7 It s,,"louldbe noted that the tOGOresearch literature is
only a subse~ pf a more general literature devoted to
computer pro~i11~amminga d its effects. on qognition. For
reviews of th:tsiliterature see Hassett, 1984i Pea, 1984;
Linn, 1.985; Linn & Dalbey, 1985; Dalbey &: Linn, 1985;
Underwood& Underwood, 1987; Salomon & Perkins, 1987;
Johanson, 1988; Dudley-Marling & Owston; 1988; Salomon &
Perkins, 1989; Martin & Hearne, 199()i McCoy;1990.
/.)
conductied by l?apert, his asso(.._·-t;es ..and other researchers
who share this methodologit:lal o;r.ientation (e. go, Papert I at
\ 1, I j
al,o, 1979; Watt, 1979; Turkle, 1984; Turtfl.e & Papert, 1990;
Lawlel;:', 19B1; 1985; Lawler et al., 1986; Forman s Pufall,
1988; Franz & l?apert, 1988; Hoyles & Sutherland, 19R9; Hare.l
& papert, 1991)1 have either been sHPported or challengeCl by
\··~·--1
'jrese.archers "Who adopt a quantitative and experimentally
based research method to verify the effects of LOGO.pl1
childr~n' s thinldn,g in general and on their problem-solving
skills in particular (e.g., Gorman & Bour'ne, 1983; Clements
& Gullo, 1984; Siann & Macleod, ~~a6i Clements, 1986; 19871,
Horton & Ry,pa, 1986; Mayer & Fay, 1987; Pea, 1.987; pea,·
Midian & l(urland, 1987; Rieber, 1987; IJehrer, Guckenberg &
Lee, 1988; poulin-Dubois, McGilly & senurea, 1989)8. 'rhese
contradictory empirical fi.ndings have in turn gene!rateclt(,
amongst others, debates about: appropriate research methods
to verify the effects of LOGOon cogfiition (e.g., Salomon,
1984; Mawby, 1985; Clark, 1985; Bracey, 1988; Papert, 1986;
Becker, 1987; Pea, 1987; Walker, 1987; Madd.ux, 1989;
Salomon, 1990; Watt, 1990; clark, 1991), and the role of
teaching in the LOGOe'l'lVirqnxllent(e.g., Tetenbaum & Mulkeen1
1984; Leron, ·1985; Simon, 1987; Hoko, 1~a6 De corte &
-
Verscnaffel, 1989).
8 General reviews of some of this literature can be found in
Krasnor & Mitterer (1984); Michayluk (1986); simon (1981);
Lepper & Gurtner (19.89);' Chang (1990).
In particular, Papert's theoret:tcal-c. ideas have been
criticised as Urhetoricalte (Brown, 1984) ; "abstrusely
phrased" and "metaphysical" (Rezanson & Dawson, 1985); and,
very importantly, failing to take "some of the major
premises of l?iaget's theories about the development of
learning'* into account (Rousseau & Smith, 1981, p. 52).
Al.so, the critics _.contend, l?apert's claims about the
~~.i
cognitive and ed.ucational benefits of LOGO are based on.
"anecdotal" evidence (see Winer &I de la Mothe, 1983; l{rasnor :"
& Mitt~rer, 1984 i Lepper & GUrtner, 1989), informed by a
J
"technor01'nantic" view of computers (S.imon, 198?) , and
predicated on "a naYve faith in the educational efficacy and
adequacy of rich environments" (Ragan, 1989, p. 32) which
pron1~fsedmore than it has delivered (Hawkins quoted by
Hassett, 1984).
tn response to some of these oriticisms papert (1986; 1987)
has repudiated the purported promises about the value of
LOGOto lpromote certain th inkin~ skills in childrel'l as
//
having no support in his writings. More importantly, he has
charged his critics with engaging in '~technocentric 119
(!
thinld.ng (Papert 19~7
\\
1988) and thereby, "missi!l':}' the
g,\ 'l'he term "technocentric" is (leriVed from piaget' s notion '
of egocentricity or centredness in the child and is used by
Papert to signify the propensity to focus exclusively on 'the,
technical object whlle ignoring the .context of its use. n
//("O-~
pointe, (Papert, 1986) fbf the LOGOpn.i,losophy. This tendency,
he contends, is evident in both the exclusive focus on LOGO
, .. . ~)
and the qomputer as 'agents' capa._bleof affecting children's
cognition in a 'simple and predictable way, .,and in the use of
a ""'<~reatment lUodelu10 research methodology to v~rify the
attainfitent of such presumed effects. With regard to the
former Pap~~t believes that most LOGOrasearchers have
"missed the point" that LOGOis only a "cu).tural elemen:t"
within the' broader ulearning culture" that may help children,
to consbzuct; the kinds of (mathematical)' kno'V,',ledgewhich our
,. .. CJ
society considers, difficult to" master.
Similarly, ,/)in their use of a res~arch methodology which
attemp'ts lito reduce what:. are rea,/{lY the most important
('":1 .
t, f
components of educational situations - people and cultures ...
,j'1
to a secondat'y, facilitating 1:'01e-' (Papert, 1,987, p, 23),'
these researchers have "missed the point:" of the complex
((
"cultural process" of learning (lhl'ith oomputers). Thu),
Papert contends, the 'negativ~' results r-acorded in-the LOGO
literatUre are more a .function of techno,centric thinking and
positivist r~s'earch methods than a 'failure' of LOGOto
fulfil its purported promises.
"If
10 Tqe "treatment mq,del" is ~the classical experimental
research design involving a 'control and an experimental
group 'V.rhichis exposed to a particular "treatment" t.o verify
the effic'acy of the treatment in relation to the "untreated,j
control group.
In their ~ebuttals to the for~going criticisms LOGO
researcbGrs have. in turn' criticised what th~y believe to be
P~;i1ert,·s unarrow construal of what constitute9 experi:mental
researoh" (Pea, 1987, p. 6), argued for "tbe importanoe 'of a
methodology that maximises falsifiability" i.n LOGO re.searoh
(Becker, 1987); urgeq Papert to recognise the nece.ssity of
'~;I$;'ound researoh and evaluati.on"· to justify the educational
USe of LOGO (Walker, 1987, .p. 10), and so on.
\}, ~
()
Although superffcial,\ 1the .foregoing aocount conveys .a sense
c;of the nature and ~cope of the lIocmtroversy and paradox"
surrounding pap~rt 'oS" igeas and LOGO research. Specifically,
it shows that there is a .continuing <lisput~ 'centred. on
Papert' s specif Lc ol~ims about the cogtiitive J:jen~fits of
LOGO and, (;;omputers and an equally contentious debate
,. - 'if! r!
oonc~:rning his research :methods to authenticate these
c.laims. A$p:i:·ra.it~nresearchers who are new to this area of
research .ar,e therefore faced with the difficult problem,
"what should we belie,ve, and WhY1J11 '\tsimon, 1$187).To resolve
\\ .
this, problem I believe that it is net.....3sary\\to deal with the
following questions, amongst otherf~, raised' by the LOGO
literature:
11
• What are the cognitive benefit.s I) (if any) of using LOGO
and are these purported benefits 'supported by Pape!t't·s
writings?
Ii
• Is l?apet:~ justified in his assertion that (most) LQ99
researohers have flmissed the point"?
• what is 'the point of the LOGOenterprise'?
A possible. way qf answering these questions and resolving
"
the disputes outlined above is to reoognise that thes~
oontroversies are not unique to. Papert 'f} ideas, and LOGO
~.~
researc~. Very interestingly, these controversies seem to,
(.":
'.recapitul.atei the earlier, Jand continuing) debates about .7'
-
the interpretation or Piaget Is ideas, the validity of his«:
;"'. .... - ~
clinical research methods anq findings I ~~d the application
of his theorY to eduoation. ThusI insofar as this
'recapitulat.ion' can be shownto be oorrect, it would follow
that the re-oonoeptual.isation of piagetian theory and"
researoh on the basis of Lakatos's ('1974) IIsoPhist;ioat~d
falsiticationism" may help us to resolve the controversies (I
witHin the LOGOresearch domain.
proceeding from the foregoing premise I will defend Papert's
assertion that LOGOresearchers have "missed the point'. by
locating his 'ldeas and researoh on the LOGOlearning
environment within the oontext of the Piage1;:ian researoh
programme. Specifically, I will argue that most researchers
'~,
have failed to see the continuities between piaget·s genetic
(I
epistemology and papert' s "exercise in an applieq genetic
epistemology" (Pape::rt, 1980; p. vii)11 as an alabmration of
aspects of the pfagetian research progrannne'in the concexe
of a computer-rich world. This failure, I will further show,
has ......i\~~" turn II led to (i) a misunderstanding"" of the
epistemological origins and natur~ of Papert' s ideas about;'>
/ ,)
computers and cognition; (ii') the misrepresentation of the
0;'
LOGO programming language as a variant of computer Aided
Instruction; and
<:,~)
(iii) misinterpretation of his,
/J
reSearch as an exclusively psychological and educat:ional
among 'others,
':;
the qu~st~ons raised by his elaboration of th~' Piagetlan
1.:.~
~~~ fi
exercise( )her than a means for answering,
"'''~". __ / (i
research programme. In view of these shortcomings I will'
argue that Papert is justified in asserting that LOGO
(~,
researche'ts have "missed the point" and in repudiating the
claims about the cognitive benefits of LOGOimptlted to him.
Lastly f on the basis of my re-casting of Papel/it's work as
an elaboration of the Piagetian research progranune I will
argue that Simple falsifications do not dis-confirm a theory
(Lakatos, 1914) and that th~ conditions that mayrefute some
of Papert1s theoretical assertions have not yet been
realised.
11 The complete statement reads ilan exercise in an applied
genetic epistemology expanded beyond Piaget's cognitive
emphasis to include a concern with the affectiv ...·~.My
emphaSis in this research report will be on the cognitive
dimension of Papert Is \>/orkand will exclude the affective in
order tQ, restrict the scope of the report.
To defend the foregoing claims I will
c),
first present an
~xposition of piaget's genetic ep!stemolog;y and the
Piagetian research Programme as the framework for
~\_ - ('.'
und,e::b'standingpapert' $. ideas and research. SE§condly,I w,ill;
provide a detailed discussion of (a) papert'selaboration of
)~ "
the piagetian research programme, and (b) the 1,OGO computer
\l 11
language and learr:.in':1 ehvironment and the nature of t}:le
constructivist cactivities it intends to promote. Finally, I,
will argue for the necsssity to locate papertls work within
the framewo~k,.of the Piagetian research prograrnnte as the
basis for future research.
II
I!
/f
IN DEFENCE OF PAPER-TIS "EXERCISE IN AN
APPLIED GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY"
F:t':.Om.its inception a central concern of the LOGOresearch
literature has been a perceived. "fundamental tension"
(Leron, 1985) between Papert 'S piagetiari ,'"'"iew of
"successful learning" as "a process that takes place
without deliberate and organized teaching" (Papert, 1980,
p, 8), and his belief that the compubez'and LOGOmay
provide children with the means to construct "powerful
ideasll12 such as procedural,isation. Interpreting Papert I s
conception of If,aarning as "learping without teachersU
"(Papert, 1986 [emphasis in the)) original]) I numerous
researchers (e.g., Krasnor & Mitterer, 1984; Pea &
Kurland, 1984; Leron, 19a5; Simon, 1987) found that
children learning LOGO"v1ithout being taught" failed to
acquire the powerful ideas which Papert purport~dlY saw
as a necessary outcome of using LOGO.This failure,
according to some of 'these researchers, was a dir~ct
consequence of Papert's adherence to a Piagetian
conception of learning. Consequently they proposed either
-
the adoption of "quasi-Piagetian learning (QPL) - which
assum.es a more acti ve role for teachers and learning
12 In Papert's (1980) understanding "powerful ideas" such
as "debugging" (Whichwill be discussed later),
"planning", "proceduralisation", etc., are "intellect.ual
tools" which may facilitate the child's construction of
knowledge. These "powerful ideas", I would argue, are
akin to Vygotsky's (1978) "psychological tools!!, i.e.,
the means through which humanscometo master their
intellectual and physical activity.
materials" CLeron, 1985, p, 28) or the rejecY..l,9l'1;of the
(' i
"rigid, stereotypic, out-dated vieWISo·f l?iage'b~/s)theory""
, ': 0
(Watson, Nida, & shade cited by Shade & Watson, 1990, p e.
377) in favour of "the knowledge generated\, by new
"
inforw~tion-processing
I
approaches to learning and
cognf,tion" (Simon, 1,987, p. 118) t for example.
Leaving aside for now the fact that the abov~ i
researchers, amongst others, have "missed the pointU of
Papert's clainls abo\l.t the outcomes of using LOGO: (L e. 1
as pos$ible and not nece$sary outcomes), I believe tllat
(, ,',' ;\
the perceiv~ld "tension" is more a function of these
\\
researchers' (mis)under$~and.;ingof piaget c, (and PapertJs
. ;f Q
particular interpreta.ti~n. of Piaget) than a "tehsionu
j '.~
between }Iprocess and outcome' in paper-e·s thinking. Very
interestingly, this misunderstanding of Papert appears to
IJ
be a ' recapi.tulation t O,f the earliGr misunderstanding
(and misrepresentation) of Piaget (Groen, 1978; pe,Vrie.s,
\~
197'8; l\ffmii & De Vries, 1918; Johnson & Hooper, 1982;
Duckworth, 1987). That is, as with piaget where
researchers fused his epistemology with his pS,l'chology'
(VoneChet 199{}) and interpreted, for \:.!,xample, his
findings on young children's inability to conserve
continuous volume as a rationale for teaching
interpretconservation skills, LOGO researchers
children's current failure to acquire "powerful ideas" cas
entailing the necessi ty to teach these ideas more
formally. In the earlier case the researchers failed t6
see piaget's epistemological assertion about the
biological and dialectical necessity (Kitchanel;', 1985)"
for (human) biological organisms to consczuct; the·
knowledge of conservation as they develop" Similarly,
uconcerninq "Papert' S thinking, researchers have "missed
the P9,int" of his essentially gpistemological claim abou-t::
the potential
\~
impact and LOGOon the
" .:"'-~"-
development" of ,cognition and, consequentny , they have
interpreted his work as an exclusively psychological and.
educational enterprise. As such, I would argue, Piaget's
assessment of Flavell's (1963) exposition of hi$ithinking
as "~;erhaps
II' ..
insUffidientl", .-
o
too exc lus Ively psychological and·
epistemological" (pp. viii ix) is
\\ .". 'equally appl~cable to the .bulk 9f the LOGOresearch.
This "insufficiently epistemological" interpretation oif
Papert's work, I believe, is a consequence of the more
general tendency to Ipsycbologise' Piaget' s episbnInology
and to disre~ard the ongo~~g debates and developments
'J
within Piagetian theory and research (e.g" I Gallagher &
Easley, 1978; sigel, Brodzinsky & Golirtkoff, 1981; Modgil
& Modgil, 1982; Scholnick, 1983; Overton, 1983; Neimark,
DeLisi Newman, 1985; Bearison Zimiles, 1986;
~
Inhelder, de Caprona & Cornu-Wells, 1987; lliben, 1987).
These tendencies ·apart, most LOGOresearchers also appear
to subscribe to a ··nal.ve falsific~'t.ionist., conception of
scientific reSearch which disregards Lakatos'S (l974)
view that "purely neg~4/c.ive,destruqtive critiCism, like
,"y
'refutation' does not eliminate a. programlIle" (p. 179) 7
With regard to the former con.tention I .believe that with. \
the exception of' 'someresearchers (e. g., Feuerzeig I 1986;
Groen, 1978; Groen & Kieran, 1983; Kay, 1991; Lawler,
1981 & '1985; Lawler, ,;~t aJ,.., 1986; Schank, 1986; Solomon,
> .- .II
1986; Turkle, 1984 i and the contributors to Forman &
pufall (19SS) and Harel & Pc;lpert (1991», the
overWhelming majority of LOGOresearchers bring an
empiricist "reading" of Piaqet to bear on Papert's
thinking. In this process they mieconstrue not only.
·/"r"
Piaget' $' theory but ignore Papert' s (1980) :st.ipulation
that his interpretation of piaget's ,:!rheory is
"unorthodox" and that the educational i:rnplicat.ions which
he derives from this .interpretation are "very
unorthodox" • consequently, these researchers "miss. the
point·, that Papert· s primary concern is to uncover a more
;:.-
it
"revolutionary" piaget .. i.e., Pi,iet tbe epistemologi~t
"whose epistemological ideas m},,;yhtexpand the knowIl
, ({
bo4hds of the humanm~jlCf;'(Papert, 1980, p, 157),. - rather
t.han the "conservative" piaget who Shows what childr.en
lack at particular stages in their development. With
their "naiVe falsificationist~' research orientation these
\\
!"researchers have further treated Papert Is theory as a·,
s~ngle theory 'which, they believe, has been inval:Ldated
-
through tl;le 'refutation' of some of its hypotheses. What
these researchers "miss" in this regard is that Papert's
theory is part od a continuous "sEiries of theoriesll which
make up the Piagetian research programme.AS such, it can
only be evaluated as parrr of this series of theories and
even then, accord.ing to takatos (1974), it is necessary
to recognise that we are dealing with !fa long and often
frustrating process" (p. 179).
'::[10 addre,ss these misunderstandings in the LOGO research
literature, and to show the essentially epistemological
. ~,
nature of Papert's claims about the 'effects of computers
and LOGO on cognition, I "would argue that it is
"
imperative to locate his work within the framework of the.
Piagetian research programme. cortsequentJf!)Imy'defence of
t;:·v-; "(
Papert's ,lIexeryise in an a~Plied genetic epistemology" ,~
,will proceed from,.C,(~!lexposition of Piaget •s «;;l;~p,etic
\,~) ""~\ __ ~_.~ J ~;;;
epistemology and the Piagetian ,j research. p~~:~,_,_...,ut.ie.-
Thereafter, I will provide a, detailed discusg;ion 4 of
Papert's project as an elaboration of the l?iagetian
research I'progranune in view of, the computerisation of
mqdern society. I will then discuss the LOGO pr(;}gramming
<0 I.
language and the natUire of the activities it intends to
:promote. Lastly, I will review the questions posed in the
introduction of this research report and argue that
papgrt is
!. I
justified in his assertion that LOGO
researchers have "missed the pointu•
Part 1
Piage:t I::; Genetic Epistemologyl3
Genetic e!,)istemology, according to Piaget, is the study
of both (Kit\ohener; ~981) the transitions "from a lower.
level of knbwledg'.) to a level t'lat is judged to be
higher" .(Piaget, 1970, p, 13) and "the mechanisms of the ="
increase of knowledge" (Piaget quoted by Kitchener, 198:1"
p. 402).. In pursuit of these objectiVes Piaget proceeds
from the assumption that there is a "simila~ity between
biological structure/function and epistemolog.j.cal
structure/function" (Kitchener, p. 404) and
contends that the biological methods used in comparati ve
1/
anatomy ... vdz , , "the study vi (homologous strnctures in
adult organisms and (the study of) the ontogenetic
development of the lndi vidual" (ibid, p , 404) are
comparable, by analogy, to the mf'thodsi:l::o be used in the
study of th;~ transitions and mecnanf.sas ill. the growth of
knowledge. Frotn this perspective genetic epi.stemology is
thus Ita mental comparative anatomyU (Kitcbener, 1981)
which studies the evolutionary· development of the
structural relationships between certain concepts. When
13 In view of my primary intention to elucidate papert.' s
interpretation of Piaget's thinking my discussion of
genetic epistemology w.ill be superficial. For more in-
depth expositions see for example Rotman'.(1977); VuYk
(1981); Atkinson. (1983) ; Kitchener (1981.; '1985; 1986);
Chqpman (1988)( }nd Voneche (199C).
this method proves to be inadequate it is $upplemef',tt;:edby '.i
ths study: of the origin and development of theS,e concepts
in the 'individual."
\\
The f~r.st method, the historico-critical method, is
,.',
concerned with the historical \l"origins and development
(i. e., historiogenesis) of the st:t:-uctural relationships
between those concepts; (e.g., t.ime, space, causality"
logic, ·'etc.) that Kant conside;-ed neceuaary f especially
for s~ientific thinking (i. e
U
., the level of knowledge
"that is jUc1ged to be higher").~ This method, Piaget
corrcends, is not suf.ficient to the task and should be
'Il
supplemented br{ an investigation of the or igin and
development of the above congepts in the individual
(L e. , psycHogenesis) • Such an investi,gation I Piaget
believes, necessarily entails genetic psychologica.l
research and !.t:,\,erefore it is imperative for genetic
1/ ii '.
epistemOlogy h';;'o take "psychology seriously". This
research is not, howeverI an", end in itself but ie,
intended "to provide answer-s to questions about genetic
epistemology" (Kitchener, 1986, p, 27). Also, in its
endeavour to uncover lithe' machand sms of the increase of
knowledge" it is only concerned with those concepts which
Kant considers necv~sa:ty for scientific thinking. Lastly,
and very importantly, although such re!:;earch is conducted
with real individuals, p;laget a.rgUesthat
a fundamental epistemological qistitlction must be
introduced between two kinds of subj e.cts or two
levels of, depth Ln. any ,su'1ject. Th~re is the
'psychological subje'IJt' centred in the conscious
ego whose functional J:'~le is inoontestabl~, but
which is not th~ origin c; of any structure of
general knowledge; but there is also the
I epistemic· subj ect' or that which is commonto
all. subjects at the same level ·of development,
whose cognitive structures derive from the most
general mechanisms Of. the co...orai.nation ,of
act.Lons, (Piaget in Beth s Piaget; 196(;, p. 308)
Thus, on the basis of the caveats introduced above, the
genetic psychological research conducted within genetic
epistemology is concerned with Uthe psychogenesis of the·
rfundamental !',categories of thought in the epistemic
subjegt from infancy to adulthood" (Kitchene:r, 1981, p, :"
409) •
The methods and objects of study of genetic epistemology
outlined above raise, however, the problem of the
relationship between historiogenesis and paychoqenesLs,
Does psychogenesis recapitulate historiogenesis according
to the biogenetic law that "ontogeny recapitulates
phYlogeny"? Are the tWDstrands of development completely
autonomous, or are they related in more compt.ex ways?
piaget's research on the stages of development" in b,qth
I,'
domaLne showed that sometimes there are "strt).ctural
parallels" and' "partial Lsomoz'phd.sms" in the aequence of
their occurrence (e.g., J?iaget & Garcia, 1989) but at
other times the sequence in historiogenesis is completely
inverted in psychogenesis14 (Kitchener, 1985) • This
14 This phenomenonwas found in the development of
geometric knowledge and, is q\lite important for
understanding Papert's thinking. This issue will be dealt
with in greater detail in mydiscussion of Papert's
"applied genetic epistemology".
complex relationship raises a further question about the
(c) particular sequences 'of development discovereg by Piaget.
Are these sequences biologically or logically necessary
in their oceurz-ence? According to Kitchener- (1985) an
explanati\'On of biological necessity is inadequate, While
~~ argum,ent in favour qlf'a logical necessity is unable to
account for tke inversion of the sequence in some
instances. Consequently, according to Kitchener, the.,
Sequence of stages discovered by Ptaget could be
,interpreted as dialectically necessary. According to this ;"'
int'(;~rpretati,on
development should qlways (and does nor,mally)
attain its goal v even thou9'h this goal is not
predetermined or narrowly fixed a priori. Given
the constraints imposed by certain orthogenetic
principles togetl4>~r't'lith the init6al and, boundary
Gonditions , the ,;particular way the goal is
attained is' open co to our f.ree and creative
c6nstruction. (Kitchener, 19a5, p. :p)
The fore~oing proplems tlo~wi,th.stand.irtg,jpiaget contends
that the explanatorr mechanisms invol vea in the domains
of historiogenesis and psychogetiesis aJ.·~ the same. 'l'hat:
is, the explanatory mechanisms obtained by psycholo,:!ical
rese~:rch on the' orig:i'n and deveLopment;..of the. concepts of
time, spaca , causality I etp., in the individual aLso
apply to the historical o~igins and deve.lgpment of tb~
structural re.lationships ,between these concepts. Thus,
l:).avin~ outi~lnep .the natut,e and scope ,of genetic
epistemology , it i.s necessary t;P-;1 look more closely at the
tV
"mechanisms of the increase of knc.wledge".
\\
')
Following fron\' the pre')upposition 9f a similarity bet1ite~in
,<~r'
"biological structure/function and epistemological
strucbire/function" merrcLonedabove, piC\get contends "~hat
o j
there is a •similarity' between biological and
epistemological adap.tation and tlo.\.\t, the latter is a.. . . . IJrl A~,~~~
~'.:
necessary outcome, of thi3 f'orll\er.. Consequently, his
genetic psychological research on the developm~nt of tthe
concepts necessary for soientif.i.d thinking' in the.
individual proceeds from the <b;~~,q,......t~l~lp~f(mise that it
j..' ,,~' ..~~'''' <,•.'
~Js functionally necessary ,,)';i;\t ; ~r", ~,,~gi'o:t;'<3'anismsto :"'
,_ . f ' '., '-.i:!"
r__ _,';_ )', ..', , ,'," , .. ,\
ma.intail'l their contj_~ued viaJ.1~, ; .> ," (Vl;;:ro~iflas~rfeld,;,:l:9B~;
,-;;--,-.,- )-.',
'I' ( .. \
1.988) in an uncertain anu contiJ"lllally changing
envirot)'!rlent. More spec.iticallY t"'t"lr' Piaget
the organization of all life is Qharacterised by
(\ unstab~ equilibria that ar,!~ continuously
modified l;Iy contact with the environment, but
nevertheless tend toward stabilH·y even as they
are modified by the environment. (Chapman, 1988,
p, 23) .
Given the disequilibria, continuous modification, and
,tendency toward equilibrium of all life forms, the
{f
1/
Ii i.mportant questions for Piaget are, "How do living
1/
\\. ... .~:t"ga~~~smsmaintain the integrity of their internal
II •
\5tructural organisation despite the instability created
within them by a continuously changing environment?", and
secondly, "Howdo living organisms modify their internal
structural or~anisation in response to a constantly
changirlg environment to ensure not only their continued
viabili ty but also to maintain continui ty between hewer
and existing forms of structural organisation (albeit on
a higher level
I~'
of equilibrium)?" In both instances,
Fiag-at argues, it is an organism' $ ability to autQ- or;
self-regulate which helps it maintain an equilibrium,
however incomplete, between already constructed
structures and between these structures .and a changi~g
environment. This idea of auto-ragulat.:iipn as the
"underlying causal mechanism" (Kitchener, 1985) or
"generative mechanism" (Harre & secord, 1972; Miller,.
1987 i 1989; 1989a) of development is crucial for piaget.
!n his view it is the mechanism responsible for the
construction of new structures and more complex forms of
internal organisation as well as a conservative forCe
that strives to maintain the integrity of eXisting,
viable structures in the organism. This universal
tendency of or~anisms to maintain an equilibrium between
themselves and the environment is also important for
Fiaget because it is a means for distinguiShing
develop;ment - i. e. I Il.changethat led from j~ lower level
of equilibrium :to a higher one" (chapman, 1988, p, 8) ~
from mere change.
According to Piaget the biological mechanisms involved in
~
this "tendency towards equilibrium are the contplementary
processes of assimilation and accommodation. !n the
process of a$similation the orga: ism incorporates
external qstuff,lS into previously constructed structures,
15 The use of this term is deliberate and intended to .
signify ~ view I share with von Glasersfeld (1984;. 1988)
about Piaget's ontology versus his epistemology. That is,
piaget does nat: deny the existence of an external world
and through the modification of these structures the
organism acconunodatesthe structures to external ·stuff~.
At soma point, however, novel 'stuff' in the environment
defies the processes of ass.imilation and accommodation
thus causing a disequilibrium in the organism.. To re-
establish its equilibrium the organism is compelled to
auto-regulate or equilibrate 011 a higher level. .tnthis
process .existing structul~es are transformed into more
elaborated structures which retain their continuity with
older structures while simultaneously extending the,range
of 'stuff' that can be assimilated and accommodated into
the newly elaborated structures.
Although the processes of assiluilation, accommodation,
equilibrium, ~nd eqt'i.L].~,bratiQnare used to explain the
!:liological adaptation of organisms to a changing
environment, Piaget. sees the same processes operating on
the epistemological level. What this means is that the
epistemic mechanisms of assimilation, accommodation;
equilibrium, and equilibration are responsible for the
increase of knowledge.and the transitions from a lower to
a higher level·of knowledge in the epistemic subject from
~
infancy to adulthood. Using these 'mechanisms', the
knowing SUbject actively constructs its own knowledge and
but argues that we can only come to know it through our
own constructions. Hence, the external world is initially
undifferentiated "stuff" and it is only through a knowing
subject's own constructions that the external world
becomes known. (cf. Fiaget's account of the development
of object permanence in the child.)
in this process it passes through an invariant sequence
of episte:mic stages. of development, viz., the sensori ...
motor, 'pre-operational, concrete operational, and formal
operational stages.
To verify whether these epistelllic mechanisms "have an
instantiation at all", piaget sperrb the larger part of
his life in genetic psychologfical research and; in the.
II
process produced, a psYCh810gical theory of the
development of intelligence. This research, a~ noted
a;bove, wa.sonly a means for answering the questions about
the mechanismsinvolved in the transitions "from a lower
level of knowledge to a level that is jud.ged to be
higher." and was not an end in itself. HoweverI despite
Piaget's stated purpose, most psychologists saw his work
as an exclusively psychological enterprise. Consequently,
they attempted to replicate his research using more
rigorous experimental research methods or to apply it
directly to educational practices. In both instances the
results were generally "negative" or "incol~clusive" and
an incre~~ing number of psychoIoqLatis began i,'ttodoubt the
scientific validity of piaget' s theory a~\d research.
This doubt and the subsequent rejection hf piaget's
"
theory raise numer-ous questions about the'!: nature of
scientific research. '1'0 address these\1 problems
researchers such as Groen (1978), Rowell (:,,1983), and
Beilin (1992), among others, have argued th~:t Piaget's
Ii
work should be conceptualised as a Lakatosi~in research
prograll'.me.In the next section, therefore, ! wi:ll discuss
the piagetian research programme as a
understanding Papert's theory and research.
"basis
The piagetian Research Programme
I)
In his metatheoretical analysis of the nature and
p)Sogress of science Lakatos (l:974) contends that
scientific research is no.t based on a (,single theory but
t " j;/) •
"a succe;f3sionof theories. • usually connected by a
remarkable Qontinuity: Which welds them/into research
programmes" (Lakatos, 1974, p. 132 [e~(phaSis in the
fl .o. ",J
original]) • Such research programmes, he fUrther
prQsc:r.:,ibe certain
some metho9.ological rules which
\. .
avenue~ of research (negative
believes, include
heuristic), while other rules propose avenues of reseafch
to follow (positive heuristic). The negative heuristic is
based on a methodological decision Which renders certain
theoretica,l assumptions incapable of refut~ltion. These
,assumptions, Lakatos contends, constitute the invariant
llard core of the research programmeand are commonto the
',1
qrowing succession of theories in the programme. The hard
c'ore is
a~lxil:{ary
furt9¢r shielded bY
/
,>/
hypotheses generated
a protective belt
by tbe' succession
of
of
theories within the programmeand it is· these hypotheses
uwhich na (ve) to bear the brunt of tests and get re'"
adjUsted, or even completely replaced, to defend the
thus-hardened core" (p. 133). The positive heuristic, in
contrast, consists of methodological suggestions on ho\'1
the "refutable variants" or auxiliary hypotheses of the
:\~esectrch pr6granune to be developed, Inodified or
Ac:cording to IJaJcatos a
(,
research programme, is
,progressive I if ! i1t: is able to increase its content
through a C011sistently prd'gressive theoretical
prd.blemshift (i. e. I a capacity to make novel predictions
, , ,
con~~istent:IY)and an intermittently progressive emtJi.rical.
s,hi.ft (i.e. f the cccas Ionaf confirmation of at least some
of tllose novel prc~d.tctions). In contrast, a progralnmeis
fdege\n.erate' if ilt does not increase its theoretical
con~ent and consis,tel1tly fails" to discover new phenomena ,
If this c, \\happeru~; the 'degenerate' prcgranme will
eventually be super-seded by an alternative and more
,progress ive " j~esearch programme.
Although superficlct.J;i the foregoing account of Lakatos's
conception of "the methodology of scientific re~earch
programmesn adequately captures his alternatiVe to the
naive falsi:t?icationist view of the nature and progress of
scientifj;¢ research that tends to dominate ~"!\ainstream
Psychq.1ogical . research, amongst others. The latter
tend;~ncy notwithstanding, a numper of researchers (e. g. ,
G:r;;.)en,1978; Rowell, 1983 i Beilin, 199,2) have argued that
Ilakatos provides Ifa useful integrative perspective"
(Rowell, 1983, p. 61) for understanding l?iaget t s theory
and research." In agreement with these researchers I would
contend that this perspective may fUrther help us to
place Papert's theory and .research within its proper
r'~:..:getian context as well as showing why, on a
theoretical and empirical level, LOGOresearchers have
"missed the point". Given the latter intentions, my
exposition of the piagetian research progral\Ut\ewill be
hrief and I will concentrate only on thos,e aspects of the
programmethat are directly pertinent to Papert· s theory
i~
and research.
\\
\~
\
If we keep in mind Piage1 s fundamentally epistem,~3:ogical
concerns and his view 6f himself as "one of the chief
;.;
'revisionists of ~iaget'" (Pia:get, 1983, p, 703)6 it is
no surprise that his psychological theory of cogn~f.ive
development is not a single, mono},ithic ,,and unchanging
enti ty , hut a theory that went through continual change
(Beilin, 1992) • In its quest to answer the
epistemological questions discussed above, the
psychOlogical theory (and it,S related empirical research)
paSsed through four phases and in eacK' of these phases
something new and important was added (Beilin, 1992)"
HoweverI despi te these Significant changesI the theory
retained an essential ct.lntinuity in its basic assumptions
and purpose. ·9onsequently,
\\
in the".,;opinion of Groen
(1978) ! Rowell (1983) and Beilin (1992) " Piaget's
,d 3
entek-prise "is more than a theory: ~t is a research
.. P )programmeon a vast scale" (Bel.ll.n, 1~;92, p. 191 •
~~
)
It!
The hard core of this research progranu;ueis primarily
epistemological 1978) and contains a number of
hypotheses about the "similarity between biological
structure/function and , epistemological
structure/function"; the relationShip bet.ween-,the origin
and growth of scientific knowledgeand the development of
intelligence in the individual; the idea that knowledge
is actively constructed by a knowing subject through its
activity with objects in the external world and that the
development res4lting from such construction 'WoUldfollow
a definite sequence; and" most
\ .,
importantlY, the.
contention that equilibration is the generative mechanism
responsible for the increase of knowledge in the :'"
individual as well as the transitions from a lower level
,::-.:c
of. knowledge to a level that is judged to be\~c}iigher.-
These (and other) core assumptions are •protected I from
refutation by the negative heuristic of "epistemological
triviality"
experimental
(Groen, 1978),
whioh
whir;::h disqualifies
research fails to deal with
Ifepistemologically significant" tasks,' i:1lndthe negative
heuristio of the "diale,qtical neoessity" of the sequence
of the stages of deveLopment., That is, all else being
equal, development wi1.1. ~Jways f.a:llow a partioular
sequence as a resul t of equ:\'.li9t, \1 and in the event
\
of structures ellterging outside this \)setntence, they ahou Ld
\.
be seen as either temporary .or only ~i~pable of surviving
if they merge with the structures of the main sequence of
development (Groen, 1978). The positive heuristio of the
programme inoludes working towards a oonstructi vist
genetic epistemology (Rowell, 1983), using the olinical
,l(
method to explicate the underlying structures of the
individual's performanoe, finding oorrespondences between
the dev~;topment of scientific knowledge and the
development of intelligence in\ the individual, and to
look for 'aberrant' structures as the explanation
empirical results which are not consistent with the
predictions of ,the hard core ..
Despite the waning popularity of Piaget' s theory and. the
competition presented ~y
\\
\,
altJernative theories, Beilin
(1992) maintains that "the theory is stil,l very much a
1)
contending presence in the free-for ....all that defines ;'"
current psychological research" (p. 192). As such, Rowell
(1'983) and Be,ilin (1992) agree that the Piagetian
research prograllUnecontinues to display a consistently
,_:::;
progressive theoretical problemshift with regard to the
continuing refinement and elaboration of the concept of
equilibration (Moessinger, 1978; Rowell,. 1983) and the
significant changes to the theory which are becoming
increasingly evident as more of Fiaget's posthumous
publications appear i.Jl English (Beilin, 1989; 1992).
correspondingly, the research programme dip;- \ays an
{, \::
intermitteT).tly progressive empiric:al shift not ~mly as
the all"eady formidable body of empirical data il'lCreaSes (~
with piaget' s posthumous pUblications but also in the
continuing research endeavours of those whif t identify I
with this research programme (see for e. g. t Gallagher &
Easley, 1978; Sigel, Brodzinsky & Golinkoff, 1981; Modgil
s Modgil, 1982; SCholnick, :1983;Overton, 1983 i Nei~ark,
'\\,
DeLisi & Newman, 1985 i Bearison .& ,zimiles, 1986;
Innelder, de Caprona & Cornu-Wells, 1987; Liben, 1987).
Th1.:ts.,contra~ to watson, Nida and Shade (quoted by Shade
& Watson, 1990,.p. 371. \ who want tn discourage educators,. U (l
from relying upon the "rigid, stereotypic: out7dated
)
views of Piaget9 s theory" , "the Piagetlan research
<~il _, _ _ " _', _ _ _ _',' -!'programmeJtlhasnot degenerated nor be.en superseded by an
<>
alternative theOry with greater explanatory value. In
this regard l?apert ' s elaboration Of the research
programme to include
!-, 0 ..
iieWf'r 'epistemic objects (i.e.,. .
computers) for subjects to act on Is a significant
contribution to the progressive theoret,ical pr,obl.elllsp.ift' :"
and progressive empirical shift of .the progr~mme as ,?t
whole. 'To ·urtderstand the nature of this cont.riib~tion the,
r~'e~t part of this re;fearch Pt~':~:i.ect:,wil\l be devoted to
\\ ,; ~, ;;J
Papert Is "e}Cercise in. an".,applied ~enetic epistemology" ..
\\_
o
i:
c
\)
Part 2
:.)rogramm~dinstruction is indeed ccnduci,ve to
learning, but by no means to inventing,
unless, following S. Papert w s expelriment, the
child is made to do the prograllUl\inl;himself. .
Jean Piaget (1973, p. 7)
::_:,
The context of human development :i.IS always a
cut ture, never an isolated technol(:;\gy. In the
presence of computers cuLture~; m:l.ght ohange
and with them people IS ways of l4;)arning and
think~tng. But if you want to undj;~rstand (or
inftuende) the change you haw! to (::enter your
attention on the culture not on the
computer.
Seymour.}?apert (19$17,p. 23)
papertts "Exercise in an Applied Genetic Epistelllology"
("",'
In contrast to Pape:r:t's eat'lier writ,ing's ~hich provided
only tantalising suggestions of the relationship between
his work and the piagetian research progranune, a morte
recent publication appropriately entitled "The
Conservation of Piaget" (Papert, 19a:S) clearly
demonstrates his allegiance to the hard core of this
research programme:
Whether one has conservation of piag-=t will depend
on what one perceives as most impott:ant in the
thinking of the great master. My ownview ,is that
the essential aspects of his Work have nQt fallen
by the wayside. On the contrary, they are s·t:tonget'
and more relevant than ever. (p,apert, 1988, p. 3)
35
At the same. thle I however, Papert contends F, that the
reSearch on computational objects and the d.ifferent forms
Of acti vi ty that :they engender in children do challenge
aspectp ~f piaget' s thinking and i:herefore
1:\ !,
some of what Piaget b..<elieved will have to be
changed. But whether one sees -this as disproving
,Piagetian theory or aA elevating it to its next
stage of development depends on what one counts as
most important in Piaget. (ibid)
(r
From this and subsequent writings (Papert.f 1991; 1991a),
..
it is claar that Papert does not see the 'disconfirming'
evidence generated by this new area of researqh as
disproving the core assumptions of piaget'~ genetic
epistemology. Instead r he believes that the ' extension'
of the research programme to includ~ "objects-to-think-
'. .. . ,l'.',. . . . .~...-" _. .•. '. ,.' __":'" . •. .'.:iWJ.th" (Papert, 1980) or "eprstemJ.c obJec;ts" (Lewl.n, 1987)
such as computet's and LOGp have elevated it "to its next.
if
s.tage of development'., 1.e. , it has contributed
significantly to th~ progre~sive theoretical'problemshift
and progressive empirical shift of the. Ci-esearch
programme. This assertion notwithstanding Papert has not,
as far as I have been able to ascertain, systematicallY
shown....the rel~,tionship between his work and the Piagetian
research programme. 'l'hus, as a :i:irst foray intc this
area, my exposition of Papert' s "exercise in an applied
genetic epistemology" will he explore\ltory. In" tl1e first
section I will discuss the hard core,
i_>i~{
genetic
epistemological assumptions of his proje~'t. and then look
a·t his "unorthodox" interpretation of Piaget. ,After that
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1 will elucidate the "appiied" dime!nsion of ohis work "by
examinin,g the LOGO programming language and the fo.rms of
activity that it intends to prc,mote. The resultant
framework will, I believe, Clearly '7E~stablishthe veracity
of Papert' s assertion that LOGO researchers,;/, have "missed
if
GiVen Papert's numerous writing!s that with.
"l?iagetian learning" and "constructionism" I believe that
il there can be no dJLspute abollt his tlnqualified acceptance
of the
! ' :
cql1strl,\r iv.,i.sm and Its underlying causal
mechanism, viz. equilil:)l;ation, whill,h make up tqe hard
core of the l?iagetian research pr()gramme. In fact, in
c
1963 Papert had already ar~ed tha\t "even if Piaget·s
hypothetical const:r'uct of equilibration appeal;'s' wrong or
incomplete, it will have to be replaced by another th~ory
of .~quilibration" (Papez-t qllo.ted by Moessingerl' 1978, p.
265) .• Although the mechanism of equilibration is assumed
without fUrther discussion i.n his writings on computers
and learning, the foregoing qUote clearly shows that
Papert accepts it as the generative mechanism responsible
for the growth of scisntific kl}owledge. and the
development of intt-~llig~.mce in: tb.~ individual. c;1l'OllOw~n9.
from this 'he therefore "ooncurs with Piaget 's view of a
relationship between tlte growtJ:vof scientifip k~owledge
i.1
and the development of intelligence in the· indIvidual
\papert, 1980).
(]
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These basic agreements notwithstanding, Papert (19BO)
challenges Pi:aget's (1964) conception of the relative
unimportance of social factors in determining the
invariant sequ~nce of the stages "of ontogenetic
developmeflt and, very interestingly, poi:pts to the
possibility of the inversion of this sequence and the
development of new cogniti veestructures as a consequence
of significant social change. At first glance the notion.
IJ
of an invert~d' sequence of development appears to go
against the negative heuristic which is col1Jcernedwith
the necessi ty of the sequence of the stages of
deve,lopmentand seems to threaten the integ:r;ity 0 of the
h(;'\rdcore of 'the t'iag¢tian research programmeas a whole.
However, if we keep in mind piagei;.'s own research on the
ontogenetic development of geometric knowledge and his
;\
\,
)i
',\ I!
explanation of its relation to the historiogenetic
seiquencet Papert Is claim is neither radical nor as
damaging to the piagetlan hard cObe
(i
as it initially
appears. T.he related claim that social and cultural
factors may have played a more significant role in the
ontogenetic sequence discovered by piaget is" more
c~allen~1ingbut still not ,if thraat, to the Piagetian hard
\\ Ii
core. It retains a commitmentto ecr:,}.libratiQn as the
·.•.'i
fundanvantal factor in development and strennthens the... '0 ~
I,
programme's progressive theoretical and empirical,. shif;t.
by including the epistemic objegt in the process of
construction. I will look at each of these issues in
turn.
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In his research on the development of geometry in the
individual Piaget found that the individual sequence of
development from topological to projective, and fillally
to Euclidean geomet-rYcompletely inverts the historical
sequence of Euclidean, projective to topological geometry
(Kitchener, 1985). This "genetic paradox of geometry"
clearly falsified the biogenetic law of recapitulation
and presented a serious challenge to Piaget' s hypothesis.
about the relationship between individual development and
lJj
the history of science16• Accol:ding to Kitchener (1985),
l?iaget failed to address this challenge adequately but
would have attempted to explain it :by appealing to social
factors and the mechanismof reflective abstraction. Thus
Piaget .would lfeontend that the individual sequence of
development was "repressed or overridden" by social
j\
factors)! such as technology, the social and economic
'1':;::'--:"'';;'''~-'::':'';'7_'''::':':::
division of l~ laboul\., etc.,
.. ))
responsible for the" general
which he saw as largely
~istorical transition from a
Ci
lower level of knowledge to a level that is jUdged to be
higher (Kitchener, 1985). Such factors would, however, be
secondary to the more impor't,ant psychogenetic factor of
reflectiVe abstraction in explaining the asymmetry
betweEU1individual: development and th~ history
"
of
science. Expanding on ClaparecleY s Law of the:; grasp of
consciousness (prise de conscience) which holds that
16 According to Ki.tchener (1985), the "genetic paradox of
geometry" mayexplain'Piaget's equivocation on the exact
nature (L, e~\, correspondence, isomorphism, .:parallelism)
of the relationship between individual development and
the historical development of scientific thinking.
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individuals are not generally aware of their mental
operations but only of the results of such operations,
and furthermore that individuals only become aware of
their mental operations when they encounter obstacles to
their thought, Piaget developed the notion of reflective
abstraotion17• According to this idea individuals are
normally unaware of the underlying processes of thei r
thinking (ref lecti ve abstractions) even though such.
processes do resul t in conscious r conceptual outcomes
(reflected abstraction). The implication of this notion
is that the histdrical emergence of scientific thinking
(reflected abstraction) ap!>ears sooner .than the
{'i?;
underlying operations upon Which it is based (reflective
abstract3.crrt), ,..or I as piag-et contends, "the order of
reflection r,,?verses that of construction" (.Kitchener,
-:"
1985, tp, ~ 3.9) • ThUS, even though certain forms of
knowledge are ontologically prior in their construction,
the epistemological realisation of such knowledge occurs
much ,late,r and this, according to Kitchener, could
explai.n the "genetic paradox of "geometry". By appealirtg
to the notion that '!,the ord,\erof reflection reverses that
ii,
the pfagetian research programme
Ii
therefore anticipates l.to someextent) the possibility of
of~\
fT'· '~:i'
construction"
inversion postulated by Papert ana renders il:c., less
damaCjingto the hard cor~.
17 This idea will be discussed in greater? detail whenwe
look at the LOGOprogramminglanguage and the acti vi ties
it intends to promote.
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In contrast, Papert's particular formulation of the role
of the epistemic object in the process of construction is
:more 'novel and opens up new possibilities of
investigation for the Piagetian research programme.
According to Papert (1980), the social, cultural and
natural environment sets constraints and possibilities on
the knowing sUbject's constr-qctive activity and,
concomitantly, determines the invariant sequence of
epistemic stages of ontogenetic development discovered by
Piaget. Specifically, he contends that in the
construction of knowledge a suqject necessarily uses the
tactile, visual and kinaesthetic m'aterialspresent in the
total environment and that the constitution of these
materials plays a definitive role in the type of
knowledge which is constructed and the relative ages qt
which it is conetrructied, For examplef the abundance of
paired objects (e.g., knives and forks, cups and saucers,
:mothers and fathers, etc.) in the environment is a
sjgnificant cultural "building block" in the child's
early construction of one-to-one correspondences.
converselY, the ,relative paucity of cultural building
blocks that can simplify and concret.iseoperations such
as seriation and conservation may play an ~qually
important role in the later constructiol1 of these
,"concepts. What thi.s implies is that in papert's view
environmental,;materialsare not merely a neutral given in
the individual's constructive activity. Instead, they are
an, embodiment of sooially CO)1structeq knowledge whiCh
~) ~;
'aotivates' the gra~p of consciousness/reflected
(\
41
abstractions and ' shapes' the kinds of knowledge the
~ndividual constructs at various stages of her
development18•
On the basis of this shif't from objects as a given to a
conception of socially constructed epistemic obj.ects on
which the episternic subject acts19, Papert extends the
theoretical problemshift of the l?iagetian ~~esearch
programmein the following ways. l?irst, he argues, the
\\
later development of f~,.bnaloperations is more a function
of the availability of suitable building blocks which
could simplify and concretise the formal than the:
inherent pornplexity of abstract thought as Piaget
believed. Sec.pnd, given the significance of cultural
materials in ths constructive process, papert holds that
the character of these materials plays a decisive role
n()t only in determining the invariant sequence of the
stages of development but also in the later construction
of formal operations within a culture and the
develop..,ental time-lag that was found to exist between
18 pi~g~t accepts that objects are not a given but
".i.mrn~rsedwithin a !networkof (social) rel.ations" (Piaget
& Garc'.ia, p., 266). He does, however, hold that "the, real
meaning attributed to the obj.ect \lJi thin the context of
its interr.elations with other objects maydepend to a
large ext'~~ on the way society acts upon the relations
between the subject and object. But the way this
interpretation is acquired depends on the subjects's
cognitive mechanismsrather than on the contributions of
the social group." (Piaget & Garcia, 1989, p. 267)
19 papert's reformulation of piaget's dil.emmahere is
clearly controversial. He thinks that social epistemic
objects change the form of cognition and cognitive
growth, which Piaget does not. However, I do not engage
this dispute here: for purposes of myargument, I accept
at face value the case that Papert makes.
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cultures (see nasen, 1972). Thirdly,
and social~Y constructed
in.sofar as culture
jf '.
epistemic (""~"~.cts found
within' it set the constraints and possibilities on the
'\ ,,"'"types of knowledge that can be constructed and the ages
at which they are constructed, significant social, and
cultural changes could shift the boundary between the
concrete and the abstract and lead to thEl e'arlier
development of formal operations and the development of.
new cognitive s\':uctures.
According to Papert (1980), the 'unorthodox'
interpretation presented above opens up ilewpossibilities
for "applying" P iaget ' s genetic epistemology to
educatloh. Specifically, it provides a theoretical basis
for addressing more concretely" his p~rticular cencerns ,
'Viz., the learrdng and teach.i.fig of mathematics and the,c
role that ~the newly constrtfct.ed \ episte'lllic object, the
computerF may play in this process. This concret;e
intervention proceeds from an analysis of existing
conceptions and pl\\adtices in mathematics educat.Ion and
establishes the framework in which Papert 0 s vehicle for
th~ learning of matheluatics, viz., the LOGO programming
.
language, should be understood.
Following" piaget's discoveries of the orrt.oqenat.Lc
construction of ~\c humber, Papert (1980) argues that the
mathematics includeq in the existing schpoJ.,curriculum is
at odds ~dth our knowl,edge of the deve)..opment of
machemat.Lcs, That. is, from both. the histori0genetic and
v
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psychogenetic pe~rpectives, applied mathematics dev¢lop'$
before pure mathematics but in the school curriCUlumpure
maths 'is taught before applied maths, if at all. To
facilitate the child's construction of mathematicai
j{nowledgeit is therefore necessary to inver.t 1;:hEi'curr~.nt
se~'!\nce by first demonstrating howmathematics works in
concrete situations and to engage with its more abstract
dimensions at a later stage. This reversal is, however,.
only a necessary condition for enhancdrrq the learning of
mathematics and is not sufficient: we also need to
analyse the mathematics learning environment itself.
Acc\.)rding,to Papert, the mathematics learning environment
of the school lacks the characteristics '<:whichcontribute
to the "success" of other forms of learning. In
pa;i:ticular, compared to the success of early language
learning which happens "naturally", "effortlessly", and
"without conscious teaching'!, the learning of mathematics
is fraught with difficulties and, despite the use of
innovative teaching methods, largely unsuc9/assful. One
'~\:\
~-'
reason for this differential success, in Papert' s view,
is that langUage is a constantly used and highly
developed epistemic object which is firmly embedded in
culture. Conversely, mathematics is relatively
undeveloped, alienated from mainstream culture, and the
preserve of a minority of people. ThUS, to promote the
learning of mathematics, it is also necessary to change
existing social perceptions of the inherent complexity of
math~matics, lire-insert" mathematics into mainstream
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.culture, and chonqe its generally abstract na.ture by
developing cultural materials that could simplify and
concretise it~
In this regard the emergence of the general purpose
computer and the computerisation of Si.gtlificant areas of
human activity have not; only initiated a process of
dramatic social and cultural change, but have also·
presented us with an epistern.ib object that 'maybe able to
simplify and concretise mathematics." Therefore, the _;"
crea.t.Lon of this new epistemic: object and the social and
cultural changes that it has started ,,~ill allow us to
verify whether (a) the late:r.· development of formal
"operations is .t;, function ol~ the availability of adequate
ep i$t"1IIio obj eots ; (b) episte1llic obj ec;;s have a r, "cis:i. ve
U I·influence on the invariant sequence of on,rgenetic
development and the developmental tinte-lag that. exists
between cultures; and (c) I3pistemic. objects could silift
the boundary between the concrete' and the abstract. As
such, these conditions could be seen as "a giant
experiment in developmental pSyChologycarried out on a
social scale" (Papert, 1.980d,p. 994).
The foregoing possibiliti~s notwithsta\~din~\ o.mainstream
!\_ \\ . :i~-_-;~';~?
uses of this new cultural mat~:r"ia;l.·;)~a~~~)no'tf.\· as }!i have
:~ _ ,I ~ _ '<:~:c_-:)/_,. . .<:... :{<
shown in the introduction t c~a~ien9'ed existing wi&~sof
\ '\ =»:
thinking about teaching ~~)d;\:,learrting (mathem~tics).
Instead, Papel:'t (1980) is of the opinion tha-&,it is used
as a new means of "force-feeding indigestible material
o<)
~~~:_:::?'~':J
1:!:1;;;?;/over front the precomputer epochIf (p. 53) • To
counteract" this reactionary tendency Papert (1988a) re-
conceptualises the computor as Ugris€O to the
constructlovist mill t. . In thi s capaca ty the computer
becomes a means (a) to remove the obstacles to the
child's constructive activity' and to qhallenge e:tltrenched
conceptions of what children can learn and at which age;
(b) to create genuinely novel lear~4,ng ..environments which.
compensate for the defic~~ncies in existing l,earning
envirt;)nmentsand encourage the "riatural" and "effortless"
construction of
.,
~'power~~l! ,
/ (
'_(I'
to foster the davelopmen't of the child IS
'<\
without consciou.s
teaching; (c-:)
meta..,cognftioni and (d) to facilitate the construction of
neWcognit.ive structures,.;' However, while computers can be
used "as grist to thei(constructfvist mill", Papert (1.980)
cautions against the reductionist belief that computers
by themselVes would cause such cognitive changes. Instead
he holds 'that it is only insofar as computers penetrate
and transform culture in gener~l 'that such changes could
., .. ./
emerge. This process, he fUrther believes, will
ultimately depend on human choice and not on the
computer.
From the foregoing analysis of the existing mathematics
learning environment and his re-conceptua1isation of the
computer,e Papert and his colleagues adopted tht! latest
advances ~n computational science and AI research to
create a new epistemic object that could sir~plify and
conc:retise the hI. 1:'ning of mathematics. The result of
their endeavours Was the Turtle graphics microworld <;In''
the medium for communicating with this "",J!l_icroworld, the
,.~.'
LO!GO programming language. Thus, r(t:.o concj.ude lDY
exposition C?f Papert's pro,jGct 1: now:.need to look at t.he
'!
!'
i'a,ppliedtt, dbnension of his genetic epistemology.
The Turtle Graphi~s Microworld and LOGO: Incubators for
PowerfUl Ideas
The metaphor that Papert (1980) uses to describe the
'1.'urtle graphics m:'broworld is that of a "mathland" in
which childre)l learn mathematics in the same way, th'at a
person living in France would learn Frerfch, i. e. ,
naturally and without conscious teai.:hing. The structure
of this "mathland" is based on the idea of "microworlds"
whioh was developed by AI researchers20 and is intended
to signify a limited domain of knowledge that can be
simUlated ~oricC>a computer. The medium throl.igh which one
communicates with this microworld is a pseUdo-English,
structured21• computer programming language oalled LOGO
20 In their attempts to simUlate cognitive processes on
computers AI researchers encountered immense
difficulties. Consequently, th~y restrict their. focus to
limited domains of Gognitive activity, a microwcrld,
which could be modelled on machines. 11:; .amples of
nt:tcroworlds are ELIZA) a program which simulates a
Rogerian-type psychotherapist; PARRY,which simUlates
neurotic behaviour; and SHRDLU,a blocks-world program
which is able to 'understand' and execute simple English
instructions to aC".lnge and re-arrange a numbez of
differently sh~ped coloured :blocks. For a more aetailed
discussion of these aur'i othe:t;.microworlds see Boden
(1977) •
21 Early high level computer languages such. as FORTRAN,
COBOLand BASICwere unstructured and this resulted in
what is called "spaghetti-type" programming, i.e .•
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Which, among other things, provides the user with the
means to control the movements of a graphic, t:r.iangular'"
shaped '" cybernetic animal" I the Turtle, which is able: to
draw a continuous line as it moves.
Unlike the microworlds found in AI research which
simulate pre-programmed and limited domains of cognitbre
acti vi ty, the Turtle gr~lphics microw,1rlci is not a,
simulation of an event or an act:tvity but a "conceptrua),
system" (Puf~ll, 198B) or "concep:tual space" (Fein, et
al., 19BB) which embodies a limited domain of
mathematical knowledge, viz. f computational geometry22.-
Very importantly g it is seen as similar to the 'real'
v.rorld insofar a~ it contains elements for the
clonstruction of knowledge without presentinq the}"!.!
didactically (Pufall, 1988). In particular, it contains
eleNentary geometric principles such as linesr angles and
vectors and is therefore a probl~m space r;'estricted to
spatial relations. Within this SPace there is a visually
guided Hobject-to-think-·withtt, the r:curtle, which has both
location and direction. In Papert's (1980) view this
'.
programming with no clear flow of oont);.'ol. To simplify
the p::r,og:rammingtask structured languages such as P!SCALt
tISP, C, and LOGOwere developed. These languages req\.dre
& more structu:t:'~d approach to problem-(..,olving and
programming__
:22Although Papert does not state it explicitly one would
assume that the uoe of computational gecmetry (which is
different from Euclidian and more akin to topologicf'l
geometry) as the entry point for learrling mathema:tics via
LOGOwas consciously intended to •fit in' with Pi.aget v S
discoveries of the construction of geometric knowledge
discussed above.
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object is akin to the plasticine and beads used in
Piagetian experiments and easily assimilable t.o the
child's sensori-motor knowledge. That is, there is a one-
to-one relation between ~c.heTurtle's movements within the
lnicrcwo:....ld and the ohild' s movements in space and
therefore she can think of the Turtle as a formal ~odel
of herself. so, by using her sansort-motor or, as ·papert
calls it, "body-syntonic" knowledge to negotiate. space in.
the real world and translating her movements into LOGO
commands that the Turtle should follo,\".. the ch11d can
create . an infiniba variety of simple anc1. complex
geometric patterns.
In her actual il,lteraction w.ith the TUrtle g.zoaph.i,cs
microworld the ohild will engage in some or all of the
foll.owing processes. First she is :r.·equired to observe a.115i
understand the effects of primiti.ve conuuands23 (or words)
on the Turtle's behaviour. After that she is encouraged
to "teach the Turtle a new word". To do this she needs to
combine some of the primitive commands according to
definite syntactic rules and label her sequence of
23 primitive commandsare elementary structures (Piagetian
schemes?) which have been pre-programmed in the LOGO
language. These include, amongothers, the commands
FORWARD(1"0), BACK (BI<), LEFT(LT), and RIGHT(R1.t') which
in conjunotion with some input parameter (e.g., 50) will
cause the turtle to move as specified .. For exampLs , PD 50
will cause the Turtle to move 50 "Turtle steps·a in the
direction it is currently facing and if the command
PENDOWN(PO) was previously issued, it will draw a
corrcdnucus li~e as it moves. Similarly, the commandRT 90
will cause the Turtle ttl l:otate right on its axis to faoe
a direotion which is at a 90 degree angle to its previous
orientation.
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commands(or procedure) with a unique name. very often,
however, the Turtle does not produce the child's intended
resul t 'and WQEm this happens she is introduced to the
"powerful idea" of "debugging"24. The actual process of
debugging entails the use of the metaphor "play Turtle".
Following this metaphor the child is required to "walk
through" the sequence of conunandsor procedure issued to
the Turtle, ie;olate logical and/or syntactical errors or,
"bUgs" in the procedure by consciously reflecting on her
bodily movements, and, on the basiS of the insight~ ~
gained from such reflections, to "fix" or "debug" her
procedure. Once the errors have been eliminated; and the
desired result. is achieved the procedure is li~belled25
with a unique name or identifier and stored for use with
the primitive commands and/or previously suored
procedures. In this way the child extends LOGO's
'vocabulary' and, concomitantly, the range of. objects
that may be used ,to complete more complex projects.
24 This idea has a numbs of implications for educational
practice in general. It Q.ttempts to break the common
sense.-assllmptiolllthat learning is about "getting it" and
intendS to CJ .ltivate a disposition towe:rds learning which
is predicerced on whether unintended/ incorrect outcomes
can be "fixed" rather than the view that learning is
about "gett.i.ng it right the first time". Equally
importan'tly it attempts to encourage a more positive
atti tude to.wards the lnaking of errors as a necessary
aspect of the construction of knowledge (cf. Piaget's
views on the importance of "false theories" in the
development of knowledge).
25 The naming of a procedure is always the first step and
not, as mydescription suggests, the last. My intention
here is only to clarify the nature of the activity and is
not intended as a description of the actual activity.
5'0
Although LOGO ,permits the use of single commands to
communicate with the Turtle in direct mode26 the structure
"
()
of the' language favours a more systematic approach to
programming and problem-solving. Thi,tSfeature of the
language has beerr responsible for some of the major
controversies in the LOGO research Iit~rature and it is
therefore necessC\ry to look more closeJ.ty at the
activities in the LOGO environment.
Like other structured languages LOGO embodies a number of
characteristics such as proceduralisation and
hierarchisation which, from theo perspect.ive of computer
science, are important for facilitating the use of
Polya's (1945/1990) problem-solving heuristics. These
heuristics, the COltlputerscientists believe, encourage a
more structured approach to problem-solving and lead to
more efficient and effective computer programming
practices. When applied to the LOGO .environment this
orientation to computer programming leads.to some or all
of the following activities: to complete a projeot
sucoessfully and efficiently the ollild should (a)
understand the problem involved; (b) divide it into
.manageable sub-problems; (c) analyse and solve each sub-
prohle).\\as an entity in i.tself; (d) name and code the
26 In the "direct mode" the user issues a command which is
inunediatelyexecuted. In the "indirect :mode"a procedure
is named, oonstructed and stored using tbe LOGO editor
and is only e:x:ecutedwhenc'called'. The disadvantage of
the direct mode is that thetSeries of single commands is
not :recoverableafter ex~cutilonwhereas named procedures
beoome part of the LOGO vO~1bulary to be used and edited
in aocordance with the demands of a particular task.
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Uplaying Turtle";
as self-containec!'\procedures using
and/or; previously ~rored procedures
-..-~;;:/
the noded procedures individually by
(f) combine. the various debugged
solved sUb-problems
the LOGO primitives
(if any); {e) debug
procedures to form J.arger, self ....contained modules if
necessary; (9) arrange and integrate the variou,s moduleS
to complete the ptogrami (h) execute the completed
program tl' verify whether the intended objectives have.
:been aChieyed; and finally, i (i) debug and correct any
"
existing errors of logic and/or syntax.
The foregoing, process is Obviousiy very efficient from
the ~erspective of computer science but it is quite
contrary to the constructivist spirit of the Turtle
graphics microworld and the LOGO philosophy in general.
However, it is exactly because of their belief in the
former and the neglect of the' ,latter tliat LOGO
researchers have attemptad to verify whether t.he use of
LOGO ,o[ould enhance this type 'of structured problem'"
solving in children. Also, where this
,
((
oueeome has not
been achieved, these researchers have felt that it .t~
neceasary to teach these problem-sol ving heuzistics more
explioitly. In Papert Is vi~w the Turtle graphics
microworld and the LOGO programming language. are only
"incubators for\Filwerful ideas" and 'therefore both of t.he
\, ,
foregoing endea-ij-\iJursmiss the point. First, he argues
that these problem-solving heuristics are only a
contingent and not a nece.ssa:r:y·outcome of u~ing LOGO
SecondlyI he opposes the fot'mal teaching of these
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heuristics as the way to interact with the Turtle
graphics microworld because that would be tantamount to
what Weizenbaum (19a~) calls "the imperialism of
instrumental reason". What is important for Papert is the
constructive activity itself and the
mathematica127 knowledge which she constructs by
interacting with the elements embodied in the Turtle
graphics (lticroworld (see PUfall, 1988; Fein, et al.,.
1988). Thusp to understand the child's activity in the
LOGO emr-;,ronmentwe neap to look briefly at piaget' s
conception of the role of activity or action in the
construction of knowledge.
Implicit in the LOGO resear,chers' belief that the logical
structure of LOGO will necessarily produce certain
logical outcomes, is the empiricist assumption that
knowledge is derived from experience in a simplistic a,ng
uni-directional manner. In oppoaitic:m to this "myth of
the sensory origin of knowledge" (l?ia~et, 19'12) which
sees endogenous knowledge as a simple internalisation of
\
exogenous knowledge (Piaget, 1975), .Pial;get"(1983) argues
that
in order to know object.s the subj ect must act
upon them: he must displace, connect, combine,
take apart I and reaSsemble them . . . From the
.__------------------
27 Most LOGO researchers tend to concentrate on the
development of specific programmingskills rather than
the construction of mathematical knowledge. Although such
skills are important they are, in Papert's understanding,
secondary to the construction of mathematical knowledge.
In this regard thes~ researchero have again "missed th~
point".
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. • ..... Il ... ,most elementary sensor~motor~,act.Lons ,(such as
pushing. and pUlling). to th,e nfoS~ sophisi:ieat~'d.
intellectual operations, which are. interiorized
actions" carried out mentally (e.g., :joining
together, putting in order, putting into one-
to ....one cor~espondence)c knowledge is constantly
linked to ac1;~ions~or operations" that is, with
transformatidns. ~\\(p. 104, emphasis in the
original) .
/-;:;.;7/t/ .!,Followl.ng from the importance of physical and mental
;)
IC activity or action in the construction of knowledge the
important issue for P iag,at ic~, ~''1erefore to explain how
physical actions are internalised and co-ordinated into
operatory structures (i. e., groups and lattices) which
can be appl'ied to any objects, or wbic:h can runce.tcn
,
without any objects (as in pure mathematics). Accoi:d~hg,
to Piaget (1976,) I the process 0
of a s,eries of co.....ordinatio
lternalisatioll consists
of actions which are
const! tuted on three 'levels The pract,ical or sensori-
motor co-ordinations constitute Lev\~l 'i while. the
I'
conceptual cb'"',ordinations :makeup Levels II and' III. The,;57:~cc""
. /I'
I!
three levels of cb-ordination are interdependenu ~nsof~r
as Level II uses some of the component.actions of Level
I I ~hile Level III relies on the co..ordinations of' .Levels
I and II. Seen as a contin~ous_P~;;~i:i~iS~.~:,~\:avel I is the
i' ".:' .~_I '-? - \'---\):/
level .on which the subject (5:acts(~\ bbject-s by combining
- . l~
them, taking\it,hem apart, and re"'as~~t.\bl;i.ngthem. At ;Level
. -"_,,
types of abstraction,
are <lnternalised through \\two
" 11
/i
empirical abstraction \\ and
\\
\
)}
to become "meap:Lng-
1\
_!!351).(Piaget, 1976, p.
II these matp""iai actions
r~flecti ve or reflexive ~hstraqtion,
bearing
Empirical
represents. tlon~i~'
abstraction provides subject. with
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descriptive ideas of the overt features of .the materi&l
j\
actions of Level Ij while reflexive abstraction uses thec;
~,nformation obtained from the co-ordinations (:,ofmaterial
(~
actions to make "inferential (':",-ordinations." , i. e. I new
connections between actions which go beyond the
observable characteristics of those actions. These
inferential co-ordinations include additive co....
ordinations (where actions are joined), sequential or'
ordinal co-ordinations (where actions succeed each other
(.
in a temporal sequence), one=co=one oorreSpOndence co-
ordinations (where a correspondence between actions is
established), and lastlY, co-ordinations which establish
intersectiQns between. actions. ,All of these 00-
ordinations, according to· Piaget (1976) I have parallels
in formal logic and therefore form the basis of the
development of logical thought structures
individual.
in' the
Ii
Initially, aCClordingto piaget, the individual is unaware
of the processes of empirical and reflexive abstraction
.pnd it i.s only when she beging to reflect on her thinking
that she re~ches Level III. At this level she becomes
conscious of the products of her reflexive abstractions,
Leo, reflE:!oted abstractions, and is then able to
/l
theorise about the nature of the external world. Thus;. b~\;
u~ing the interdependent processes of empirical and
irefle~~ve abstraction, the ind;ividual constructs both
and logico-mathematical knowledge (see
Gi.Ulagh,er, 1978; Ka:m~i& de Vries, 1978.; Kamii, 1,985).
<-;;-.-
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HoweverI within the latter process we also need to :take
account of what Piaget (1975) calls thee.'Alpha, Beta and
Ga:mmacompensatorystructures (see Rowell, 1989).
According to Piaget (1975) when an individual is
confronted with novel objeQts, eventSI or exogenous'
knowledge wh.ich disturbs her equilibriu.m, her initial
response will be an attempt to neutralise the disturbance.
by ignoring it or deforming it SQ that it is no longer
.:;\
experienced as a disturbance. This tendency to resist
change is ca? .led Alpha compensations. The equilibrium
Which is established through this compehsat,ion is only
partial and unstable and insufficient to prevent ..further
disturbances. Eventually, therefore, the Alpha
compensations are superseded by Beta compensations in
wh~ch the individual elinlinates the distUrbance by
integrating it as a new variation into her existing
knowledge. The reconstructions of the 13eta phase are
finally completed. by the Gammacompensatsdonsto become-a
system of reversible operations which is able to
/;~';'.,
• ,. /r_/.
the ol:'l.glnal dl.sturbance and anticipateaccommodate
simil~r disturbances in the future.
The imPlications of the foregoing conception of the
nature of activity (and its related com~tensations) for
Understanding children'S activity in the LOGO environment
al.a numecous and open up a host of pO$sibilit.ies fClr
future. research~ proceeding from the premise that
exogenous k~owled.ge is reconstru~t~g endoqenousLy , we
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could use the positive . ii .heur~stlc of the piagetian
res~arch programme, viz. I the clinical method, to examiner;:>
the various abst.ractions in thr> context of the Turtle.
graphios microworld and attempt to explain the particula+
kinds o,f knowledge that individa~~1.users construct, or I
we could look at the various compensations and the
gradual re-orqanisation of existing knowleqge, and so on.
In 'this way We could begin to understand how a newer·
epistemic object constrains or facilitates the
construction of knowled.geon a psychogenetic level e.g.,
its effects on the stages of development and' the boundary
shift, if any, between the concrete and the abstract}
which in turn may have implication,~ for understanditlg' the
h~<FtO'riogsnet.lcdevelopmer.;t6f sc;hmtific thinking.
\
Unfortunately,. «except (for the research
,,
conductied by
Papert, et al. (1979); watt (1979); Lawler (1981; 1985);
Lawler, et a,l. (l986); Turkle (1984); the contributors to
"Forman & PUfall (1988) and Harel & Papert (1991); and
Turkle & papert (1991) t 1tbe f(lregoing ideas are virtually
absent from the LOGO research literature. II"Istead, what
lltOst"LOGO researchers have looked at is What the negative
.
heuristic
II
e!lf the research programme would
oonsider to be the "epistemologically trivial" dimensions
of the process of learning while us,~ng a research
lnethodology, viz., the experimental research method,
which is unable to elucidate the underlying mechanisms,
structures and functions that the process of learning
entails. Thus, in complete agreE!lnentwith Papert I would
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contend that these researchers 'have indeed "missed the
point".
(\
Conclusion
/As an attempt t(j'ihterveneon a 'theoreticallevel in the
"contJ."0versyand parad~x" surrounding (the LOGO rese,fl.rch
literature, I have presented what I consider to be a more
consistent •reading' of seymour" Papert's theory i hd
research. In particUlar, I have taken his i.
characterisation of\,his work as "an exercis~ in an.
, .. \\applied genetic epistemology" as the most approt,'i,riate
starting point for Iidefending his assertion that the
, 'majority of the LOGO researchers have "missed the point".
consonant with this conception of his
1'-/
wO):-k as
fundamentally .ml,memological, albeit an IIappliedlr
epistemology., my exposi,tion of Papert's theory and
res;earcn focused consistel'),tlyon i'ts epistemologicaJ.
premises and the conclusions ~~~)prqctice that he derives
from these premises. In this regard I showed that
Fapert's epj,stemology can only be understood in the
context of Fiaget's genetic epistemology and argued that
his overall project should be located \'within the
Piagetian research prograilU'ne.From this perspective, I
further argued, his work can be seen as making a
~
significant contribution to 1;.heprogressive theoretical
problemshift of the programme through its theorisation of
the role of socially constructed epistemic objects in the
development of cognition I as well as increasing the
empirical content of the pro9ra\'m\~through its research
on chi;i,~l~en's activity wi,'\:hsuch objects. Lastly t to
complete my discussion of papert.s prClject ,I looked at
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f/'
its "applied" dimension, viz. I the ':J;''drtl¥ graphics
microworld/LOGO language and the .,epistemologically
significant.1I aspects of childrert~Vs activH:,,'l"with these
epistemid objects. With regard to the former I showed
:",\
that Papert's epistemic objects have been misrepresented
as didactically prQsentiiig inforMation rather than
embodying elements for. the construction of mathematical
-
knowl~dge. This misrepresentation, I further argued, is·
1,\
\\' .:
based on an ~~hpir.icist conception of leal.ning wh~ch l~ads
to an U~pistemologicallY trivial" construal of children's
activity I t<1oulCt
contend, there is! ,an essential
:i .'
Papert's cdPSt:r.uctivist framework
frameworks of his c1'it.ics and detracto;rs. Iroi,'1 den;~~'nst(£'3.t."f}
, , .," 1\
this inc(.lmpat~l.,b{lity! w'tn:~3)tdretllrn, ,¢6 the .questf(ons
_'.0'1,;,/;'/ I(
posed in the ihtroduct.ioIl Jb:e'\lthisltesearch r.eport~
"\'/" ,~.\ _- \\
(.i
• What are the cognitive benefits (if ~:U1Y) of using IpGO
>
and are these purported benefit,s fupported by papert' s
writings'?
From my presentati.on 'I .believe it is clear that 'the
.
cognitive benefits which are assuided td~ result from
children's interaction with the LOG~O learning e,nvi:ri?nment
are predicated on an ,.empiri\:;ist conciibtion 0-1: learnitlg
\'
\\
and are therefore not consistent with l?apel;t's
constructivism. So, whit~ it cannot be denied t.p.at Papert
('"does posit the }2ossibilitx of cerl:ain cog-rdtive outcomesl/ .;r~,
I' I
as a function of using Computers and Loa&; 1:.1~se dutcornes
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are not seen tis. 1;ieoessary. The possibility of' specific
"
outcomes being. attained is, according to Papert, open....
ended .and, very importantly; dependent on significant
social and cultural changes in which newer, socially
constructed epistemic objects such as compute.rs have
become pervasive. Insofar as the.se changes have not yet
been realised it becomes extremely difficult (if not
impossible) to Verify empirically the veracity of these
predictions at the present!, time. The' bellet that a sound
reSeat:ch methociology which "maximises falsifiability"
would show more clearly the presence or absence of such
cognitive outcomes is therefore equally misguided. Thus;,
the claim that LOGO "promised more th,an it has delive:t;'ed"l
cannot be sustained and in this regard has "missed the
point".
• IS Papert justified in his assertion that (most) IjO~O
r~searchers have "missed the point ..?
,Following Papert1s claim about the _ essetrcially
epistemological nature of his Work,!)the assertiorl that
LOGO researchers have "missed the point" is just:i.tied on
~
a nUinber of levels. First, as I have shown, LOGO
researchers tend to treat Papert's work as an exclusively
psychological and educational enterprise and in the
(i
process ignore the epistemol.ogical assumptions on Which
it is based. Secondly, where these researchers have taken-
cognizance of the Piagetian basis of hifi thinking they
have assimilated his work into a priorI empiricist
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understa.nding of Piaget and consequently missed the
• )1. .fundamentally construct~y~st nature of his work. Thirdly,
JI
~j
in their failure to acknowledge the epistemologica.l
dimension of his work, these researchers have been unable
to see the continuities and discontinuities betWeen
papert and Piag-et anq the relationship between Papert and
the piagetian research programme. In this regard they
missed the point that Papert's claims about computers and
LOGO are auxiliary hypotheses which increase the
(I
theoretical and empirical shift of the programnle. As
such, I contend, these claims only become sensible in the
context of the Piagetian research programme. By ignoring
all of these epistemological dimensio,ns of Papert t s Work
and treating it as a variant of CAl, these researchers
have therefore "missed the pointit•
• What is 't.he point of the LOGOenterprise?
On the/basis of my <3XJ!ositionOf Papert's "exercise in an
applied genetic epistemology" I and my argument that this
exercise should be seen as one of the theories that make
up the :l':'iaget±anresearch prOgramme,I believe that the
LOGO-enterprise has two impclrtant dimensions. The first
is epistemological and the second is practical. With
regard to the epistemological dimension I believe that. I
have adequately demonstrated Papert's 'extension' of
piag-etian theory to include the l~ole of epistemic Objects
in the deve.lopment of cognition. This extension, I
believe, gen1erates a number of interesti.ng hypotheses
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concerning
~)
of epistemic objects
'.;..;
in
establishing the invariant sequence of s'tages of
development discovered by )?iaget.; (b) the possibility of
the 'inversion' of this sequence of sta.ges as a function
of significant social and cultural change and the
concomd tant changes',;~\in the nature of a society 's
epistemic objects; and (c) the inherent complexity of
formal operational thinking and whether·· such thinkin9
could occur at ea.rlier ages if adequate epistemic objects
are available. On a general level the 'C911firmation' of
the.se hypqthases coUld elucidate some of the difficulties
1)
in genetid e~i,stel1lt)lo9Ysuch as the complex relationshiE
between histol:"iogenesis and Psychogenesis, and the issue
of the necessityl of the stages of development, among
others.
The practical dimension of the LOGO ent~rprise is well
known, but is, iirs I have tried to show, misrepresented as
I)
a variant of CAl': conceptualised as an ep;i.stemic object
that embodies eleI\1ents for the construction of
mathematical knowl~dge (rather than as a medium for
teaching computer programming) it esta1?Iishes a new
context within which the various abstractions and
compensatory structures can operate. Furthermore, as an
epistemic Object: W;p.ichwas conscioUs,lly daveloped to
concretise the abstract, it opens up the pOSSibility of
shifting the boundary between the concrete and the
abstra.ct which in turn could lead to the earlier
development, of formal operations ill' tile child. HoweverI
as Papert has consistently . argued, it would be
'.1,-.:
reductionist to s~e LOGd' as necessarily producing these
..
outcomes. Ultimately, it is only to the extent that, LogO
and computers penetra.t~ and transform culture in qeneral
o
and the, leat'ning environment in c, pat'ticular that these
cognitive '"effects' may eccur ,
What .all Of the foregoing suggests is tll'it
ess~ptial incompatibility J:>etweenPa.pert and
of the LOGO researchers.. T~is incompatibility, 1 would
argue, has been t'esponsible for the "controversy and
paradox" surrOunding the LOGO enterprise. Thus, to b;-eak
the deadlock that these controversies have prodUced, I
be:ie.ve. that future researchers s~ould take greater
cognh.:ance o:ttiJ the essentially ep'istemological and
.\
constructivist nature of pap~~t' s>'work arid its relatio:tl;
to the l?ia5fetian research prograntrne, because it is only
in this framework that .hiz' parti¢ular claims for
computers and LOGO can be evaluated. Also, as I have
shown above, this framew~rk is rich with possil.i'ilities
fo:r future empirical research which ·maycontribute to our
understanding ,pf the role of episte:m.ic obj ects in the
\'-comsti'uction of knowledge. as wefl as elucidating the\.>:-
relationSHip between historiogenesis and psychogenesis.
TO d\? otherwise would b~ 1;0 "miss the point". ~\
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